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With the increasing numbers of immigrants seeking to obtain political asylum, the receiving con-
ditions and the deportability of refused asylum seekers have emerged as major issues. Concern
with these questions has been addressed through renewed asylum policies involving expeditious
processing of applications, tight restrictions upon the right to work, removal of support or deten-
tion for failed asylum seekers. These asylum policies are intended to reduce alleged “pull factors”
through the use of the threat of destitution as a deterrent against asylum seeking (Da Lomba, 2006).
They also aim at reducing the number of asylum seekers that remain in the territory despite having
been rejected as refugees. In this regard, the deterioration of the conditions of reception is seen
across the EU as one cornerstone of a “voluntary departure” policy (Fox O’Mahony and Sweeney,
2010). In this article, we examine the case of Switzerland, where the suppression of social assistance
for rejected asylum seekers was intended to support such a policy. We report data from a field
study showing how, in this country, this policy induces institutional practices that prevent, rather
than promote, failed asylum seekers to leave the territory. We also discuss some implications of the
Swiss system in the realm of education, suggesting that the institutional constraints imposed by the
asylum policy jeopardize the implementation of the recognized unconditional right of children to
education.
The Swiss Federal Asylum Policy
The Swiss government decision (2004) to remove the social assistance for rejected asylum seekers
was first enforced through its inclusion in a comprehensive budgetary saving program approved
by popular vote (FF, 2003, pp. 5091–5286). This decision was opposed by most of the human
rights defenders, voluntary associations and social movements with the view that its enforcement
was conducive to destitution or increasing criminality. The authorities of the Swiss cantons were
to follow and to support the costs of the federal requirements. The interplay between the federal
and the cantonal prerogatives in Switzerland created disparities in the implementation of the legal
provisions—namely the introduction of an “emergency aid”—that followed the social assistance
suppression. The solutions thus varied locally according to the political climate and the diverse
traditions among the Swiss cantons of welcoming foreigners and offering asylum to political or
religious refugees (Vuillemier, 1992; Green et al., 2011). This contrasting reality is often obscured
by the important coverage given to the Swiss political movements against immigrants who use
the instruments of the direct democracy, such as popular initiatives, in their strategy to conquer
power through national xenophobic campaigns (Papadopoulos, 1991; Gentile and Kriesi, 1998;
Tabin, 1999).
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The system of emergency aid is based on the unconditional
right to a minimum coverage of basic living needs in order to
prevent destitution (Article 12 of the Swiss Federal Constitution).
Used mainly by individuals in emergency situations up to 2004,
it has been set up for the whole group of rejected asylum seekers
as a result of denying them social aid. The cantonal implemen-
tations include compulsory accommodation in collective centers
isolated from the urban population but there is a great discrep-
ancy over how the emergency shelters are organized: Some are
quasi concentration regimes (systematic entrance checks, obli-
gation of presence, prohibition of visits), other close during the
day, even in winter. Despite some slight local improvements in
favor of the residents, the cantonal structures are designed in
order to strengthen the residents’ dependency (vouchers for food
and toiletries) and the control of the authorities in all aspects
of everyday life. Moreover, people have to regularly renew the
emergency assistance by presenting themselves at the migration
offices (sometimes every 2 or 5 days), where most often they
experience pressures to leave, intimidations, as well as derogative
or even humiliating treatments. These conditions maintain asy-
lum seekers in a state of controlled illegality and affect negatively
the experience of both the targeted group and the agents of this
policy.
The Institutional Construction of Invisibility
Our field research (Sanchez-Mazas, 2011), conducted in four
Swiss cantons (2 German-speaking and 2 French speaking areas),
reveals that the system of emergency aid in the framework of a
deterrent asylum policy turns out to be an instrument of pres-
sure and discouragement that shapes the experience of failed asy-
lum seekers in such a way that most of them do not choose to
return to their home states. Through a series of interviews among
asylum specialists (N = 39) and asylum seekers concerned
by the new regime (N = 32), we could elicit the perspectives
and experience of these non-admissible, yet officially registered,
migrants and those of public officials, social workers, and mem-
bers of voluntary organizations.Most often, these agents reported
that this mandatory policy not only was ineffective at promot-
ing departures but also constrained institutional practices viewed
in contradiction with their mission and their values. Contrary to
the expected expansion of the number of departures, new and
unforeseen obstacles to returns have been identified as stemming
from this very policy. Indeed, our analyses show that most of the
targeted individuals actually went out of administrative controls,
while remaining on the territory in an irregular manner.
We identified several social psychological impediments that
might explain this reverse and unpredicted effect. We focus
here on two contrasting types of social psychological processes
induced by institutional practices aimed at producing deterrence
effects through pressures to leave and deterioration of living con-
ditions. The first reaction frequently encountered among our
respondents is concerned with the willingness to make a vol-
untary depart: It heightens a fundamental motivation to restore
control against attempts to constrain the behavior and pres-
sures to submit. This psychological reactance (Brehm, 1993) is
expressed in terms of determination to stay in order to resist
those institutional practices that impinge on individual freedom
and autonomy. One of the migrants interviewed in our study
(Sanchez-Mazas, 2011, p. 228) put it this way: “The more people
have their back to the door, the more they are driven to the ultimate
sacrifice: remaining whatever happens. In a more liberal system, it
would be more voluntary returns.” Together with other comments
collected, this example shows how the pressure to comply para-
doxically becomes a factor that reinforces the individual’s deter-
mination to stay at all costs. Hence, people do not stay despite the
pressures to leave, but, rather, because of them.
Conversely, the second reaction results from lasting aver-
sive conditions that make people incapable to develop a project.
The deterrent policy pursued by the Swiss government height-
ens failed asylum seekers vulnerability by inducing weakening
effects that can be conceptualized in terms of learned helpless-
ness (Peterson et al., 1995). This is clearly expressed by one of our
respondents: “We despise ourselves because we are despised. This
system leads people to self-destruction, this policy makes people to
destroy themselves. In addition, it is counterproductive because this
way we are not able not leave.” Likewise, another asylum seeker
argued that “Well, the principle is that people leave but the reality
is that people are so much deprived of their will, of their capacity,
that they become amorphous. Many of them stand around doing
nothing, like nailed down” (Sanchez-Mazas, 2011, p. 229).
In analyzing these mechanisms, we propose the notion of
“construction of invisibility” to refer to institutional practices
triggering the disappearance of the targeted persons into clan-
destinity as a result of an induced increased willingness to stay
or incapacity to leave. Such a process can be related to the wider
phenomenon of the “legal production of illegality” that has been
recently addressed on the area of contemporary migration (De
Genova, 2002). The alleged efficiency of the state action in reduc-
ing the number of registered asylum seekers overstaying after
being rejected stems primarily from the persons’ suppression
from the asylum statistics. In this way, the Swiss government
could claim the success of a policy that produces illegality and
destitution among those who have been described as “the most
legally and socially disadvantaged people in western societies”
(Castles and Davidson, 2000, p. 73). Moreover, it could pursue
this policy (that first targeted mostly young men, whose appli-
cation was rejected before thorough examination), by extend-
ing the decision to withdraw social assistance to all refused
asylum seekers (2008), including families whose “institutional
invisibilization” is problematic.
A Major Challenge for Education
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (ratified by Switzer-
land in 1997) makes primary education compulsory and available
free to all. This poses the challenge for contemporary democra-
cies of fully implementing this right when granted to children
whose parents are staying in the country in an irregular man-
ner (Laubentahl, 2011; Vandenhole et al., 2011). The extension
of this right to children without legal status represents a rever-
sal of the historical positions between parents and children in
the migration in Switzerland. While in previous years temporary
legal migrants where constrained either to hide their children
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or to leave them in the home country, the present relegation of
migrants to a no-rights zonemakes children the unique bearers of
a right to insertion into society. But this right remains fragile for a
population school inherently unstable and who cannot, for politi-
cal reasons, fully integrate the receiving society. In the emergency
assistance system especially, the overcrowding and insecure con-
ditions of the centers are highly inappropriate for school working
and involvement. Furthermore, the lack of autonomy, as well as
forms of adults’ “infantilization” through the institutional han-
dling of the residents, poses a threat to the parental image and
the educational relationships (Moro and Barou, 2003).
In the Swiss academic world, the lack of institutional sup-
port for dealing with the educational needs of these children is
a direct outcome of an asylum policy which denies any effort that
could contradict the view that rejected asylum seekers must be
discouraged to stay. This leaves the staff unprepared to receive
children from very diverse cultural and linguistic contexts and
who are often in conditions of extreme vulnerability upon arrival
at school. Teachers worry about previous “deschooling,” prob-
lems of illiteracy or severe educational delays they are ill equipped
to manage (Sanchez-Mazas, 2013). The feeling of being aban-
doned by the institution induces a sense of helplessness or guilt.
Negative stereotyping and pupils’ marginalization within the
classroom are frequent outcomes of this situation in a political
context that targets asylum seekers as undeserving and unwanted
foreigners (Schmidlin et al., 2006).
Conclusion
Under the euphemistic label (Bandura, 1999) of “individual and
institutional incitation,” the primary purpose of the Swiss author-
ities was to “increase voluntary disappearances as a result of
discouragement” (Gerber and Führer, 2000, p. 7; Tafelmacher,
2009). Besides the construction of an invisible population within
a democratic State, the Swiss asylum policy leads to the creation
of a category of people who depend on and are under the control
of the very authority that tries to deport them. In this way, it turns
into “official outlaws” (Achermann, 2009) those who remain in
the country in conditions of total deprivation of rights and under
the threat of being arrested or subject to forced departure for ille-
gal stay. For some people, this leads to a process of disappearance,
whereby they end up in a social vacuum by being excluded from
institutions and from any legal existence whatsoever. For others,
namely families with children, this introduces a tension between
their illegal status and their children right to attend school that
threatens the human right to receive education.
Unlike the interpersonal form of invisibility that is intended
to actively show disrespect (Honneth, 2001), the institutional
invisibility following the asylum deterrent policy represents a de-
institutionalization of existence leading to social death (Renault,
2004). The dilemmas and moral conflicts expressed by most of
the agents of this policy suggest that the dehumanization process
these groups are undergoing would not simply be interpreted as
resulting from individual stereotyping, prejudice and discrimina-
tion (for a review, see Haslam and Lougham, 2014). Our research
helps grasping some structural factors that play a role in a dehu-
manization process beyond, or even against, individual attitudes.
By uncovering the institutional production of invisibility through
constrained social practices and organizational arrangements, it
may contribute to capture the consequences of the sociopolitical
processes and the institutional factors that, in Western contem-
porary democracies, construe the group of stateless people, which
Arendt (1951/2004) marked out as having lost all other qualities
and relationships, except that they are still human.
References
Achermann, C. (2009). Offiziell Illegal? Terra Cognita 14, 94–97.
Arendt, H. (1951/2004). The Origins of Totalitarianism. Berlin: Schocken Books.
Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhu-
manities. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 3, 193–209. doi: 10.1207/s15327957pspr
0303_3
Brehm, J. W. (1993). “Control, its loss and psychological reactance,” in Control
Deprivation and Social Cognition, eds G. Weary, F. Gleicher, and K. L. Marsh
(New York, NY: Springer-Verlag), 3–30.
Castles, S., and Davidson, A. (2000). Citizenship and Migration: Globalisation and
the Politics of Belonging. New York, NY: Routledge.
Da Lomba, S. (2006). The threat of destitution as a deterrent against asylum seeking
in the European Union. Refuge 23, 78–93.
De Genova, N. (2002). Migrant illegality and deportability in everyday life.
Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 31, 419–447. doi: 10.1146/annurev.anthro.31.040402.
085432
FF. (2003). 5091-5286 Message Concernant le Programme d’Allégement 2003 du
Budget de la Confédération (PAB 03), Bern: C.J. Wyss.
Fox O’Mahony, L., and Sweeney, J. A. (2010). The exclusion of (failed) asylum
seekers from housing and home: towards an oppositional discourse. J. Law Soc.
37, 285–314. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6478.2010.00505.x
Gentile, P., and Kriesi, H. (1998). “Contemporary radical right parties in Switzer-
land: history of a divided family,” in The New Politics of the Right. Neo-Populist
Parties and Movements in Established Democracies, eds H.-G. Betz and S.
Immerfall (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press), 125–142.
Gerber, J.-D., and Führer, R. (2000). “Incitations individuelles et institutionnelles
dans le domaine de l’asile,” in Rapport Final du Groupe de Travail sur le
Financement de l’Asile à l’Attention du Département Fédéral de Justice et Police
(Bern).
Green, E. G. T., Sarrasin, O., Fasel, N., and Staerklé, C. (2011). National-
ism and patriotism as predictors of immigration attitudes in Switzerland: a
municipality-level analysis. Swiss Pol. Sci. Rev. 4, 369–393. doi: 10.1111/j.1662-
6370.2011.02030.x
Haslam, N., and Lougham, S. (2014). Dehumanization and infrahumanization.
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 65, 399–423. doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115045
Honneth, A. (2001). Invisibility: on the epistemology of “recognition”. Aristot. Soc.
75, 111–126. doi: 10.1111/1467-8349.00081
Laubentahl, B. (2011). The negotiation of irregular migrants’ right to education in
Germany: a challenge to the nation-state. Ethn. Racial Stud. 34, 1357–1373. doi:
10.1080/01419870.2010.538424
Moro, M.-R., and Barou, J. (2003). Les Enfants de l’Exil. Etude Auprès des Familles
en Demande d’Asile dans les Centres d’Accueil. Paris: UNICEF/Sonacotra.
Papadopoulos, Y. (1991). Quel rôle pour les petits partis dans la démocratie
directe? Annuaire Suisse de Science Politique 31, 131–150.
Peterson, C., Maier, S. F., and Seligman, M. E. P. (1995). Learned Helplessness:
A Theory for the Age of Personal Control. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press.
Renault, E. (2004). L’expérience de l’Injustice. Reconnaissance et Clinique de
l’Injustice. Paris: La Découverte.
Sanchez-Mazas, M. (2011). La Construction de l’Invisibilité. Suppression de l’Aide
Sociale dans le Domaine de l’Asile. Genève (with D. Efionayi-Maeder, J. Maggi,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 382
Sanchez-Mazas The construction of “official outlaws”
C. Ackermann, M. Schaer, M. Roca i Escoda and F. Coumou-Stants)(ies
Éditions).
Sanchez-Mazas, M. (2013). “L’impact des mouvements migratoires cotemporains
sur la vie scolaire genevoise,” in Actes du Colloque Ecole et Migration du 18
Novembre 2012 (Genève: Département de l’instruction publique, de la culture
et du sport et Service de la recherche en éducation), 48–53.
Schmidlin, I., Tafelmacher, C., and Küng, H. (2006). La Politique d’Asile Suisse à
la Dérive. Chasse aux “Abus” et Démantèlement des Droits. Lausanne: Editions
d’en bas.
Tabin, J.-P. (1999). Les Paradoxes de l’inteìgration. Essai sur le Rôle de la Non-
inteìgration des Eìtrangers pour l’inteìgration de la Socieìteì Nationale. Lausanne:
Editions de l’eìeìsp.
Tafelmacher, C. (2009). Droit à l’aide d’urgence: le grand retournement. Plädoyer,
3/09, 56–61.
Vandenhole, W., Carton de Wiart, E., De Clerck, H.-M.-L., Mahieu, P., Ryngaert,
J., Timmerman, C., et al. (2011). Undocumented children and the right to
education: illusory right or empowering lever? Int. J. Child. Rights 19, 613–639.
doi: 10.1163/157181811X570690
Vuillemier, M. (1992). Immigrés et Réfugiés en Suisse. Aperçu historique. Zurich:
Pro Helvetia.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Sanchez-Mazas. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The
use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in
this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 382
